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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
3
Frankel v. Roberts 50

(decided April 2, 1991)

The petitioners, Robert Frankel and Troy Yancey, attorneys
employed by the Legal Aid Society, filed an article 78
proceeding to prohibit respondent, Justice George Roberts, from
enforcing his ruling requiring them to remove from their lapels
political buttons which stated "Ready to Strike." The petitioners
challenged the justice's ruling as violative of their free exercise of
speech protected under the federal 5° 4 and state5 05 constitutions.
The court granted the petitioners' application and held that "the
mere act of wearing a button which has some expression of
political import.., is an exercise of speech protected under" the
United States and New York State Constitutions. 506
The subject of this petition involved an incident that took place
in part 30 of the New York Supreme Court, Criminal Term
"where only arraignments, initial plea bargaining and motion
practice were conducted." 507 No jury trials were conducted
there. The petitioners were ordered to remove their "Ready to
Strike" buttons. Their refusal to comply with Justice Roberts'
order led to their removal as counsel for their clients, who were
criminal defendants. Justice Roberts announced that he would
refuse to receive Legal Aid attorneys as counsel if they continued
to wear the buttons. He also stated that, as of the next day, he
would hold any such attorney in contempt.
The court began its analysis by comparing LaRocca v. Lake50 8
503. 165 A.D.2d 382, 567 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed,
78 N.Y.2d 1071, 582 N.E.2d 603, 576 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1991).

504. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
505. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
506. Frankel, 165 A.D.2d at 384, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 1019-20.
507. Id. at 383, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 1019.
508. 37 N.Y.2d 575, 338 N.E.2d 606, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
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to the present case. In LaRocca, the court of appeals found that a
priest-lawyer wearing his clerical collar during a jury trial could
create an atmosphere where the jury "might ascribe a greater
degree of veracity and personal commitment to the rightness of
his client's cause. On the other hand, religious prejudices, often
insidious and unstated, might spill over from the lawyer-cleric to
the defendant." 50 9 The court distinguished LaRocca from the
present case because Justice Roberts' court had "no jury to be
impressed favorably or unfavorably." 5 10
The court then affirmed that the principles found in the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the New York State Constitution unquestionably extend
to the courtroom. "Every citizen lawfully present in a public
place has a right to engage in peaceable and orderly expression
that is not incompatible with the primary activity of the place in
question . ... 511 Therefore, "'the crucial question [became]

whether the manner of expression [was] basically incompatible
with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time.' 5 12 The court concluded that:
[W]earing a button with a political slogan would be entitled to
the same protection that would be afforded if the button were
worn in any other public place. This manner of expression was
not basically incompatible with the normal activity and operation
5 13
of this courtroom devoid of jurors or witnesses.

The court then addressed the petitioners' contention that the
restricted speech was content based. The petitioners claimed that
Justice Roberts had told them that he would not take issue with
"Save the Whales" buttons. Therefore, they contended that
"[w]hat obviously concerned him was the content of the button
509. Frankel, 165 A.D.2d at 384, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 1019.

510. Id.
511. Id. at 384, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 1020 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 184-85 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part)).
512. Id. at 385, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 1020 (quoting
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itself which he felt would be 'unsettling' to the client." 5 14
The court noted that the New York Court of Appeals, in In re
Von Wiegen, 5 15 applied a different standard when reviewing an
official attempt to limit content of speech than it applies when
reviewing the time, place and manner of speech: "'Time, place
and manner restrictions are valid if reasonable and rationally related to legitimate State interests. Content or subject matter may
be regulated only if substantial State interests are involved and
then the regulation may go no further than necessary to serve that
interest.' "516 It should be noted, however, that Von Wiegen concerned commercial speech. The court in Von Wiegen was evaluating the conduct of an attorney involved in national soliciting.
The Von Wiegen court expressly stated that while commercial
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, "[lt is subject
to lesser degree of protection than other traditionally protected
types of speech. '"517 Thus, the standard of review employed
when evaluating a restriction of commercial speech is different
than that used when evaluating other protected speech.
Though it referred to the mid-level test enunciated in Von
Wiegen for commercial speech, the court nevertheless applied the
compelling state interest test to the present case. The New York
Court of Appeals applied this test in Town of Islip v. Caviglia5 18
and it is the applicable standard of review for governmental
restrictions on non-commercial content-based speech. The court
of appeals stated:
Generally speaking, if the regulation is content-based it is
presumptively invalid and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
However, content-neutral restrictions, those justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech and relating only
to the time, place, and manner of expression, are valid if the
governmental interest to be achieved outweighs the resulting
514. Id.

515. 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985).
516. Frankel, 165 A.D.2d at 385, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 1020 (quoting Von
Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d at 171, 470 N.E.2d at 842, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 44).
517. Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d at 170, 470 N.E.2d at 842, 481 N.Y.S.2d at
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interference with free expression. 5 19
Applying the compelling state interest level of scrutiny to the
content'based restriction at issue in Frankel, the court found that
"although Justice Roberts termed the button 'unsettling' to defendants [sic] clients, he made no inquiry of the client, petitioner
Smith, and thereafter received counsel for petitioner Smith despite his objection." 52 0 Indeed, in light of the fact that the
button was worn in a non-jury court room, the appellate court
found that there was no significant governmental interest for
restricting the speech. The court stated that "the record before us
does not demonstrate a 'compelling' state interest necessitating
the Justice's complete ban on the mere display of the small button
with a particular political message." 52 1
In Justice Wallach's concurring opinion, the order of the trial
court rested entirely on an arbitrary exercise of judicial power.
The assumption that a client's morale would necessarily be
shaken once the message of the button was perceived was found
to be without merit. Justice Wallach demonstrated this point by
referring to the order of the trial court. The order did not enjoin
future or address past disclosure by counsel to the client of the
button's message, nor did this message cause any turmoil inside
or outside the courtroom. 52 2
Justice Kupferman, in a dissenting opinion, criticized the
majority for assuming that "the Judge was concerned with the offense to his sensibilities rather than with the due administration of
justice." 52 3 Justice Kupferman maintained that "the Judge must
have decorum in the court, and must have counsel who are in the
courtroom for Court business." 524
The United States Supreme Court, in Ward v. Rock against
Racism,525 set forth the applicable standard of review for content
518. 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1989).
519. Id. at 556-57, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
520. Frankel, 165 A.D.2d. at 386, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 1021.

521.
522.
523.
524.
525.

Id.
Id. at 389, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 1022-23. (Wallach, J., concurring).
Id. at 390, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 1023 (Kupferman, J., dissenting in part).
Id. (Kupferrnan, J., dissenting in part).
491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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neutral governmental restrictions on protected speech. Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that a regulation that
seeks to limit protected speech, not because the government does
not like the message, but rather for other reasons such as time,
place and manner, is evaluated under a type of mid-level
scrutiny. This test requires that the regulation "be narrowly
tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral
interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least
intrusive means of doing so."

526

In 1991, the United States

Supreme Court reaffirmed that standard of review in the case of
Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board.52 7

Thus, the United States Supreme Court, like the New York
Court of Appeals, applies the strict scrutiny standard of review to
regulations that are content based.
The recognized principle of federalism dictates that state courts
are bound by Supreme Court decisions when defining federal
constitutional rights. These decisions establish a minimum standard which the states may not fall below. They may, however,
surpass it. 52 8 In Frankel, although the court articulated a
standard of review that falls below the minimum federal
constitutional standard and below the standard applied by the
court of appeals, it nonetheless applied the correct standard of review when evaluating the petitioners' claim.

526. Id. at 798.
527. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
528. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 556, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d at
145.
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